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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Vermax of Florida, Inc. ("Vermax of Florida"), pursuant to Rule 24(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully submits its Reply Brief in response 
to the Brief of Respondent Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission"). Now that 
the Tax Commission has identified the allegedly taxable transactions as in-state sales of 
component parts that Vermax of Florida incorporates into products for resale, this Court 
should reverse and remand the Tax Commission's determination that Vermax of Florida 
is liable for those taxes. Such sales are exempt, and the Tax Commission's effort to tax 
those component sales by claiming that Vermax of Florida owned those components at 
the time they were ultimately made a part of real property outside of this State is neither 
based on fact nor supported by the record. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because the Tax Commission incorrectly characterized certain portions of the 
record, Vermax of Florida must reply here by setting forth those portions of the record 
that have been misinterpreted. The most apparent misinterpretation is evident where the 
Tax Commission states that Vermax of Florida "argued" that its "'furnish and install'" 
contracts were statutorily exempt. (Tax Commission Brief, at 5). In fact, Vermax of 
Florida did not and does not enter into "furnish and install" contracts and accordingly 
never made such an argument. Such a characterization is a legal conclusion ultimately 
to be determined by this Court. Instead, Vermax of Florida entered into sales contracts 
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by which it sold its products to out-of-state purchasers. In certain infrequent instances 
at issue here, Vermax of Florida was also asked to provide a bid for the installation of 
the products already sold or to be sold to the out-of-state customer. At the time that 
those products were installed by Vermax of Florida's local subcontractors, they were not 
owned by Vermax of Florida. The sale was complete, and those products could have 
been installed by entities based in Nova Scotia or Tierra del Fuego, all without tax 
consequences to Vermax of Florida. The separate sale and installation of the products 
at issue are factually and legally distinguishable from "furnish and install" contracts, by 
which a seller agrees in one contract to sell and install a product, with title to pass only 
after the installation is completed. That did not occur here, and thus this Court should 
reverse and remand. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Vermax of Florida incorporates its Statement of Facts set forth in its Brief and 
responds to the Tax Commission's Statement of Facts as follows. 
Section A of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts 
The Tax Commission asserts that "[i]n 1986, Vermax was previously assessed for 
failure to collect tax on 'furnish and install' contracts." (Tax Commission Brief, at 6). 
This statement is inaccurate in two respects. First, as set forth in Vermax of Florida's 
Brief (the "Brief"), the entity assessed in 1986 was Vermax Corporation, a Utah 
corporation that was completely separate and distinct from Vermax of Florida, a Florida 
2 
corporation that merely purchased certain assets from Vermax Corporation. Pursuant to 
a Stipulation to Amend Record, this Court should note that the subject of the previous 
audit, Vermax Corporation, changed its name on August 31, 1987 to G. Hawke 
Manufacturing Co., Inc., which continued in existence until it was involuntarily dissolved 
on May 1, 1992. It is also a fact that Vermax of Florida, Inc., the Petitioner here, is a 
Florida corporation that, prior to 1987, was called Trespo, Inc. As will be described in 
greater detail below, the distinction between the two entities is far more significant than 
a mere difference in name. By failing to acknowledge that a distinct corporation with 
different owners was assessed in 1986, the Tax Commission's Statement of Facts gives 
the incorrect impression that Vermax of Florida has blatantly ignored prior tax decisions 
and treatments directed at it. There were none. 
Second, the statement once again erroneously characterizes the transactions at issue 
as "furnish and install" contracts. That error is repeated throughout the Statement of 
Facts and throughout the argument portion of the Tax Commission's Brief. As explained 
at pages 23-25 of Vermax of Florida's Brief, that erroneous characterization also 
contradicts the express stipulation of the parties, which fact stipulations the Tax 
Commission ignored or overlooked when it rendered its decision. (R.0021-23, attached 
to the Brief as A.8). 
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Section B of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts 
With respect to the installation of products purchased by out-of-state customers, 
the Tax Commission labeled installation "a component part of the agreement," citing page 
44 of the Formal Hearing Transcript. (Tax Commission Brief, at 9). Page 44 of that 
transcript does not contain such testimony, nor does any other portion of the transcript. 
There was more than one agreement. Installation was a component part of the installation 
agreements entered into by Vermax of Florida, which agreements contemplate only the 
installation of goods, the title to which had already passed to out-of-state purchasers. 
(See A.8 of Brief). With or without installation, Vermax sold its products to out-of-state 
purchasers, and the only "component" of those agreements was the sale in interstate 
commerce. Installation was a separate matter, covered by a separate agreement that could 
have been cancelled, terminated, breached, or otherwise avoided with no effect 
whatsoever on the separate sale agreement. 
Section C of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts 
The numerous problems with the Tax Commission's recitation of the history 
underlying the negligence penalty are set forth in the Argument section of this Reply 
Brief. 
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Section D of Tax Commission's Statement of Facts 
The Tax Commission repeats its incorrect description of the separate and legally 
distinct purchase and installation agreements as "components" instead of two separate and 
distinct contracts, as indicated in the stipulation filed with the Tax Commission. (See A.8 
of Brief; R. 0021-23). 
SUMMARY OF VERMAX OF FLORIDA'S TRANSACTIONS 
The following table, Figure 1, demonstrates that Vermax of Florida sells its 
products in one of two ways: in-state and out-of-state. The first type of sale involves 
wholesale, in-state purchases of components which are tax exempt, because the 
components go into products manufactured for resale, followed by sales of the final 
product that take place in Utah. A sales tax is applied to those retail sales of final 
products here in Utah, and those sales are not at issue here. The second type of sale 
involves the same tax exempt, in-state purchases of components, followed by final 
product sales that take place in interstate commerce, and are thus exempt from sales tax. 
The Tax Commission has invented a third type of transaction from the out-of-state sales, 
one in which Vermax of Florida has also agreed, via separate bid and contract, to be 
responsible for the installation of the products it has already sold to out-of-state 
customers. The mere fact that Vermax of Florida, as opposed to anyone else, is 
responsible for installing the products that are already owned by the out-of-state customer 
does not translate into a tax liability that relates all the way back to the in-state 
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component sales, which everyone agrees are exempt absent Vermax of Florida's contracts 
to install the products it has already sold in interstate commerce. 
FIGURE 1 
Out-of-State (exempt) § 59-12-104(12) 
- > Sales: title Rule 865-19-44S(B) 
passes to buyer ~ > third party installs -
Vermax arranges 
-or-
- > buyer arranges for third 
party to install or otherwise 





Now that the Tax Commission has clarified which transaction it wishes to tax, the 
resolution of this case will depend on the resolution of one simple legal fact: Who owned 
the Vermax of Florida products at the time they were installed in facilities owned by out-
of-state purchasers of Vermax products. The Tax Commission has sought to characterize 
the transactions at issue as "furnish and install" contracts. By definition, "furnish and 
install" contracts involve products that are not owned by the out-of-state customers until 
they are installed into real property and have become fixtures therein. The "furnish and 
install" characterization is legally flawed here, and runs counter to the facts in the record, 
including facts to which the Tax Commission stipulated and completely ignored when it 
6 
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made its Findings. Because Vermax of Florida sold and sells its products to out-of-state 
customers without any requirement or other condition tying those sales to a subsequent 
installation contract, this Court should treat those transactions accordingly, and not 
penalize Vermax of Florida with component sales taxes merely because it helps its 
customers install products that it no longer owns. 
I. BECAUSE VERMAX OF FLORIDA DOES NOT OWN THE PRODUCTS IT 
HAS SOLD TO OUT-OF-STATE CUSTOMERS AT THE TIME THEY ARE 
INSTALLED INTO REAL PROPERTY. IT HAS NO SALES TAX 
LIABILITY, 
In all of Vermax of Florida's sales to out-of-state customers, the out-of-state 
purchaser takes title to the products at the time of delivery in the other state. Regardless 
of what happens after that point, Vermax of Florida no longer owns, controls, or is 
responsible for that personal property. Even where Vermax of Florida arranges 
installation, and even if this Court concludes that Vermax of Florida is the installer, the 
fact remains that Vermax of Florida does not arrange or effect the installation of any 
products that it still owns. 
Because Vermax of Florida does not own the property when it is installed, Vermax 
of Florida is in the identical position to that of the contractor in Thorup Brothers 
Construction v. Auditing Division, 860 P.2d 324 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court 
in Thorup articulated the rule that if a contractor does not own the personal property it 
is converting into real property, there is no sales tax consequence to the installer or to the 
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manufacturer/seller of the products (provided the purchaser is a tax exempt entity). IcL 
at 328-39. The Thorup contractor was not liable for tax on items installed into real 
property because it, like Vermax of Florida, did not own the property it installed and thus 
could not be the ultimate consumer of tangible personal property converted into real 
property. IcL Because of the interstate nature of the sales at issue here, Vermax's out-
of-state customers are tax exempt entities, just as the Thorup contractor's school was a 
tax exempt entity. Thus, this Court should reverse and remand. 
As the facts of this case are analogous to Thorup, they are unlike the facts in 
Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), relied upon 
by the Tax Commission. In Tummurru, the company bought raw materials, 
manufactured its products in one arm of the company, and sold the products to another 
arm of the company that installed the products. The taxable event in Tummurru was the 
intra-state sale of those final products between arms of the company before they were 
shipped out of state for installation. And at all times, Tummurru owned the products 
right up to the point they became fixtures in real property. As such Tummurru was 
responsible for converting personal property it owned into real property. Tummurru is 
not concerned with the purchase of raw materials (the allegedly taxable event here), but 
with an in-state sale of final products occurring between two arms of the same company. 
Simply stated, Tummurru does not speak to tax liability on the initial purchase of raw 
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materials, and the fact that it involves an intermediate sale to itself and a subsequent 
installation of property it owns makes it inapposite to this case. 
Here, in contrast to Tummurru, Vermax of Florida bought the raw materials, 
manufactured the products from those materials for resale, and sold the products in the 
form of tangible personal property to third parties -- the out-of-state purchasers. There 
was no intra-state transaction, except for the purchase of raw materials that the Tax 
Commission is trying to tax here. But raw material purchases like those here are exempt 
as wholesale transactions under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) (1994) and Utah 
Admin. Code Rule R865-19-29S. Vermax of Florida lost ownership of the manufactured 
products at the point of delivery across state lines, and its subsequent involvement, if any, 
was solely to arrange for the installation of property it did not own. Thus, Vermax of 
Florida is no different from the contractor in Thorup who was not liable for sales taxes 
on property it installed, but did not own. 
The Tax Commission thus has not demonstrated any legal basis for imposing taxes 
on Vermax of Florida's purchases of raw materials, the only transactions for which it is 
seeking taxes. (Tax Commission Brief, at 9, 14). Applying the nondeferential correction 
of error standard that applies to this issue of law, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(b) (1994), 
this Court should reverse the Tax Commission's assessment of additional sales tax. 
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II. THE TAX COMMISSION IMPROPERLY DENIED VERMAX OF 
FLORIDA'S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT OF THE TEN PERCENT 
NEGLIGENCE PENALTY. 
A. Vermax of Florida Is A Separate And Distinct Entity With Different 
Owners From The Entity That Was Subject To Prior Audits. 
In its brief, the Tax Commission persistently mistakes Vermax of Florida for 
Vermax Corporation. As a result of that misapprehension, the Tax Commission 
continues to insist that the 10% negligence penalty was warranted. 
The Tax Commission accuses Vermax of Florida of "reinventing itself," yet 
ignores the fact that the only evidence in the record demonstrates that Vermax of Florida 
is a different entity from the subject of the prior audit. In addition to those facts added 
to the Record by stipulation, Mr. Lindsay, a Vermax of Florida employee, testified at the 
hearing as follows: 
Q: Okay. Has the Vermax Corporation always been owned by the same 
people or entities? 
A: No. 
Q: When, if ever, did that change, if you know? 
A: The latest change is August, 1987. 
Q: And what happened in August of '87? 
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A: That's when Vermax was purchased from Jerry Hawk and/or 
whoever was — they may not have been an individual himself; he and his 
family then incorporated into Vermax of Florida. 
Q: Okay. Before the Florida corporation bought it, to your knowledge, 
was it a Utah corporation? 
A: To my knowledge, yes. 
(Formal Hearing Transcript, Page 16, Lines 9-21). Mr. Lindsay later testified that Jerry 
Hawk left Vermax shortly after the 1987 change in ownership. (IcL, Page 40, Lines 11-
20). 
The documents supporting the current audit clearly indicate that the taxpayer is 
"Vermax of Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation doing business in Utah," rather than the 
Vermax Corporation (a Utah corporation) that was the subject of prior audits. (See, e.g., 
R. 0030, 0043). Once the unique and independent status of Vermax of Florida was 
shown at the hearing, the burden shifted to the Tax Commission to establish reasons, e.g. 
notice or actual knowledge, why one corporation should be penalized for the negligence 
of a corporation from which it merely purchased assets. There is no evidence, and there 
was no finding, that Vermax of Florida knew about the Tax Commission's prior 
treatments of Vermax Corporation. 
The Tax Commission improperly assumes that Mr. Lindsay had knowledge of the 
prior audit and then erroneously imputes that knowledge to the corporation. That 
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reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, there is no evidence that Mr. Lindsay had 
any knowledge of the prior audit. In fact, Mr. Lindsay's job responsibilities did not 
include the collection of taxes; instead, he worked in manufacturing, setting up a 
contracting division, and sales management. (Formal Hearing Transcript, Page 16, Lines 
3-8). His current position is director of installation. (IcL, Page 16, Lines 22-23). 
Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Lindsay would have had reason or opportunity 
to learn of the prior audit. If he had no such knowledge, there is simply no record 
knowledge to impute to Vermax of Florida. 
Second, the Tax Commission erroneously asserts that "no changes in personnel are 
in evidence." In so arguing, the Tax Commission misunderstands its burden. Once the 
separate corporate existence is established, it is not Vermax of Florida's burden to prove 
a negative, i.e., no continuity of persons with knowledge. Rather, it is the Tax 
Commission's burden to prove that a Vermax Corporation employee with knowledge of 
the prior audit continued in a position of responsibility with Vermax of Florida. See 
Johnson v. BelL 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983) (imposing on party claiming interest in 
property burden of proving actual notice on part of trustee under a deed of trust of 
predecessor's interest in land). 
Mr. Lindsay testified that Gerry Hawk, the owner of Vermax Corporation, left the 
company shortly after the ownership changed. (Formal Transcript Hearing, Page 40, 
Lines 11-20). No carryovers in personnel are in evidence, other than Mr. Lindsay, who 
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had no knowledge of the prior audit. There is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence 
in the record, to support the Tax Commission's mistaken premise that Vermax 
Corporation personnel with knowledge of the prior audits continued to be employed by 
Vermax of Florida. Consequently, the conclusion the Tax Commission draws from that 
premise is incorrect, and there is no reason why Vermax of Florida should be "deemed" 
to have notice of the prior audit of a separate corporate entity. Nor has the Tax 
Commission demonstrated any actual notice or knowledge on the part of Vermax of 
Florida. 
The Tax Commission has thus failed to put forth any evidence showing that 
Vermax of Florida "clearly had knowledge of the rules" at issue here. Vermax of 
Florida, on the other hand, has demonstrated (1) a change in ownership as the result of 
a purchase of assets in 1987, (2) the departure of the prior owner, Gerry Hawk, from the 
employment of Vermax of Florida shortly after the change in ownership, and (3) the 
existence of a separate corporate entity, Vermax of Florida, doing business in Utah. On 
these facts, no evidence exists to support the Tax Commission's assessment of a 
negligence penalty. Even if this Court found some evidence to support the penalty, any 
such evidence does not rise to the level of substantial evidence to support the finding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a) (1994). 
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B. Even If This Court Affirms The Assessment Against Vermax of Florida, A 
Negligence Penalty Is Inappropriate Under The Prevailing Legal Standard. 
Under the prevailing standard, a negligence penalty: 
is appropriate when the taxpayer has failed to pay taxes and 
a reasonable investigation into the applicable rules and statutes 
would have revealed that the taxes were due . . . . [T]he 
taxpayer can escape the penalty if he or she can show that he 
or she based the nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good 
faith interpretation of an arguable point of law. 
Hales Sand & Gravel v. Audit Div.. 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992). As set forth above, 
Vermax of Florida was not liable for sales taxes in any event. And, if it is liable, it was 
not negligent because it based its nonpayment on a good faith construction of the sales 
tax law, which acknowledges that "[wjhether a taxpayer is a real property contractor for 
sales tax purposes usually is fact sensitive." Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n. 
839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992). 
If Vermax of Florida is a real property contractor, if it owned the products it was 
installing as a real property contractor, and if its interpretation of the relevant rules and 
statutes is proven incorrect on appeal, the fact of its error does not require imposition of 
a penalty. IdL (construing penalty imposed for intentional disregard of rule1 and noting 
that taxpayer's arguments as to liability demonstrated good faith dispute, although position 
was ultimately deemed wrong); accord Hales, 842 P.2d at 895 (reversing negligence 
lA penalty assessed due to intentional underpayment implicates the same standard as a negligence penalty. 
See Hales Sand &. Gravel v. Audit Div., 842 P. 2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992). 
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penalty because of good faith argument based on understandable confusion, despite 
ultimately rejecting petitioner's arguments and affirming Tax Commission on the merits). 
Thus, this Court should reverse the Tax Commission's imposition of a penalty, even if 
this Court ultimately concludes Vermax of Florida's in-state component purchases were 
taxable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Vermax of Florida respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Commission's assessment of additional sales tax and negligence penalty, and 
remand for findings not inconsistent therewith. 
DATED this ? ^ d a y of May, 1995. 
Respectfullv^ubmitte/, /M 
Mark O. Morris, Esq. 
Amy E. Weissman, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Attorneys for Vermax of Florida, Inc. 
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